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Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [hereinafter the ACA] was signed into
law by President Obama on March 23, 2010.1 The ACA is the largest health reform legislation
in decades and has the potential to provide healthcare coverage for many of the currently
uninsured people in the United States as well as bring costs down for others who already have
healthcare insurance. 2

One of the key provisions of the ACA, and arguably the most

controversial, is the Women’s Preventative Services Provision which includes a contraception
coverage mandate for many types of group health insurance plans.3
The inclusion of the Women’s Preventative Services Provision [herein after the
Provision] caused an uproar, especially among social and religious conservatives who claimed
that the Provision violated their religious beliefs. Almost immediately after its passage, lawsuits
challenging different provisions of the ACA flooded into federal courts across the country.
Many of these lawsuits focused on the alleged violation of employers’ religious beliefs stemming
from the Provision. This paper provides a detailed analysis of a selection of challenges against
the Provision, focusing on for-profit employers’ Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom

1

42 U.S.C.A. § 18001 (2010).
Id.
3
Affordable Care Act Rule on Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women.
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/08/
womensprevention08012011a.html. (last updated Feb. 1, 2013).
2

Restoration Act [hereinafter RFRA] claims. Plaintiffs in these cases are seeking an exemption
from the Provision. This paper examines the legislative and judicial history of the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA and how it applies to current challenges against the Provision. Following the
analysis, this paper advocates against exemptions from the Provision for for-profit employers
and ultimately for all types of employers.

Background
The congressional debate leading up to the ACA enactment was fraught with conflict,
and the conflict did not end after the law was signed. Many lawmakers and citizens questioned
the constitutionality of some of the key, fundamental provisions of the ACA including the
individual mandate 4 and the Medicaid expansion 5 . This lead to multiple cases of litigation 6
which culminated in the Supreme Court case National Federation of Independent Business v.

4

42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (2010) (The individual mandate is a basic requirement for all individuals
to maintain health insurance that, at minimum, covers essential health benefits as defined by the
ACA. The justification for the mandate is based on the effects individual health, in the
aggregate, has on interstate commerce and the overall public health. Increased access helping
individuals obtain coverage is achieved through expanded coverage requirements for employerbased insurance, a Medicaid expansion, and state exchanges); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A
(2010) (If an individual does not maintain essential health benefits coverage, the individual is
subject to a penalty); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 (2010) (The ACA provides an option for
states to establish exchanges. Generally, the exchanges have the goal of providing competition
within the individual insurance market, providing cost-saving benefits in a similar way as the
group health insurance market by giving individuals the advantages of group purchasing power
and provider competition.).
5
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396c (2010). (The ACA included a provision that would expand Medicaid
eligibility to more people, with the goal of expanding health coverage access, especially for lowincome people); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012)
(The Medicaid Expansion was not upheld in full because it had the condition that states must
comply or risk losing all Medicaid funding.).
6
Nat’l Fed’n, supra note 5, at 2572 (This case was originally brought in Federal District Court
and challenged the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Medicaid expansion
provision but not the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.).
2

Sebelius brought by twenty-six different states as well as private individuals and a business
organization against Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services.7
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court upheld the individual
mandate under Congress’ taxing power and held there could no penalization for states refusing to
participate in the Medicaid expansion.8 Because the penalization provision was ruled severable
from the Medicaid expansion itself, the ACA was effectively upheld as constitutional, and
implementation proceeded.9 Implementation of the ACA is gradual with different provisions
becoming effective each year to allow a more functional transition.

Some of the earliest

provisions to take effect involved allowing young adults to stay on their parent’s insurance plan
until the age of twenty-six and prohibiting lifetime limits on insurance coverage.10 By 2014,
many individual consumers who do not have insurance through employment will be able to shop
for insurance through state exchanges, lowering the cost for individuals by creating a separate
marketplace.11
One of the most important provisions of the ACA is the Provision. The Provision
requires all new private health plans to cover eight different categories of preventative health
services without cost-sharing including, “all Food and Drug Administration approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling as
prescribed by a health care provider.”12 The fact that the Provision applies to all new private

7

Id. at 2572.
Id. at 2607.
9
Id. at 2608.
10
What’s Changing and When, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/
index.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2013).
11
Id.
12
Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women,
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/08/womensprevention
08012011a.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2013).
8

3

health plans means that private employers’ group health plans are subject to compliance
beginning with the enrollment of new plans after August 1, 2012.13 Certain religious employers,
described as

“tax-exempt organizations whose mission is the teaching of religious values

primarily to members of their own faith through employees of their own faith,” are exempt from
the provision.14
While the debate continues as to who exactly qualifies for an exemption, a key factor is
an employer’s status as a non-profit. 15 There are no exemptions proposed for for-profit
corporations. This paper does not advocate for any exemptions from the Provision, but it is clear
how churches or other organizations with a specifically religious purpose may feel entitled to
make Free Exercise or RFRA claims regarding the mandates of the Provision. However, forprofit corporations do not have this same entitlement because of their inherently secular nature
and profit-seeking mission. Therefore, despite the continuously increasing amount of litigation
being pursued against the Provision from all types of employers, this paper focuses on the claims

13

Id. For example, the new requirements are triggered when employees are hired and enrolled in
the employer-based health insurance after August 1, 2012. The requirements are triggered for
existing employees in any insurance enrollment period on or after August 1, 2012.
14
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY FOR ALL: A DEFENSE OF THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S CONTRACEPTION COVERAGE MANDATE 3 (American
Constitution Society, Oct. 2012).
15
Women’s Preventative Services Coverage and Religious Organizations, CCIIO,
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/womens-preven-02012013.html (last visited Apr. 27,
2012).
4

of for-profit corporations.16
Some owners of for-profit corporations feel they should also be able to claim exemption
from the Provision, and they have brought litigation seeking injunctions from the enforcement of
the provision. Most of the litigation is based on claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment and RFRA. The purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to protect religious
liberty from being prohibited by the government. The neutrality and generality of the law in
question determines the appropriate level of scrutiny meaning, “ a law that is both neutral and
generally applicable need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest to survive
a constitutional challenge.”17 Conversely, “if a law that burdens religious practice is not neutral
or generally applicable, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the burden on religious conduct
violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
governmental interest.” 18
The history of Free Exercise litigation guides First Amendment interpretation and the
development of other law based on religious liberty. One of the most important cases in Free

16

Overview of the Lawsuits Challenging the Affordable Care Act’s No Cost-Sharing
Contraceptive Coverage Benefit, NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER,
http://www.nwlc.org/overview-lawsuits-challenging-affordable-care-act%E2%80%99s-no-costsharing-contraceptive-coverage-benefit (last visited Apr. 27, 2013). This paper focuses on
lawsuits brought by for-profit corporations, but litigation is also being pursued by non-profits.
According to the National Women’s Law Center, as of April, 2013, there have been sixty-one
different lawsuits challenging the Provision; thirty-three of those have been brought by nonprofit organizations whereas twenty-eight lawsuits have been brought by for-profit corporations.
Because many non-profit organizations qualify for a safe harbor, meaning they have a year
allowing non-compliance with the Provision before enforcement begins, many of those cases
have been dismissed because of standing and ripeness issues.
17
Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649 (10th Cir. 2006).
18
Id. at 649; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Inc. v. City of Hialieah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application
must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a
law restrictive of religious practice must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be
narrowly tailored.”).
5

Exercise history is Wisconsin, a case involving an Amish group claiming they should be entitled
to an exemption from the state requirement of school attendance until the age of sixteen. 19 The
court found that the government did have a compelling interest in educating citizens, but
balanced that interest with the Amish, religiously-based way of life finding that the Amish
education system had measurable value, leading to the conclusion that the Amish system would
not only contribute to the overall government goal of educating citizens but also would have
little effect on altering that goal.20 As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
finding that the Amish group was entitled to an exemption from the state school attendance
requirement.21
While this case seemed like a victory for religious exemptions from state law, the
Supreme Court has not always ruled in favor of religious groups claiming a Free Exercise
violation.

In a controversial opinion, the Supreme Court in Smith ruled in favor of the

government in a dispute about firing employees for misconduct due to religious use of peyote at
work.22 The court focused on the difference between a law targeting a specific religious practice
and a law that was generally applicable, with Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasizing, “we have
never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate”.23 It followed that since the law

19

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 212-14; see also GEDICKS, supra note 14, at 16-17.
21
Wisconsin. 406 U.S. at 236.
22
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. Of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
23
Id. 878-79; see also THOMAS C. BERG, THE FIRST AMENDMENT THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION CLAUSE: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
61-63 (2008).
20

6

prohibiting use of peyote was generally applicable and validly neutral, the plaintiffs could not be
exempt from compliance, and their Free Exercise claim failed.24
The Smith decision left many religious groups feeling vulnerable about the direction of
Free Exercise Clause litigation.25 By emphasizing the compelling interest of the government,
groups felt the Supreme Court was, “exposing religious conduct to generally applicable laws, it
seemed to threaten core religious exercise in countless situations…”26 These implications served
as the impetus for religious and civil-liberties groups to join together and lobby Congress for
more assurance for the protection of religious liberty.27 These efforts resulted in the enactment
of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA).28
RFRA is a federal law that is targeted at emphasizing the role of the government showing
a compelling interest in a law that burdens religious practice.29 RFRA forbids government from,
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”30 RFRA was originally intended to
apply both to state and federal government, but in City of Boerne the court found that Congress
exceeded its enforcement powers enacting RFRA by overriding statue and local law, saying that
only the Court could delineate the rights within the Constitution. 31 RFRA has since been

24

Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
BERG, supra note 23, at 19.
26
Id. at 19.
27
Id. at 20.
28
Id; see also 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1993).
29
BERG, supra note 23, at 19-20.
30
42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a), (b) (1993).
31
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also BERG. supra note 23, at 20.
25
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amended to apply only to federal law.32 Because the ACA is a federal law, it is permissible for
owners of for-profit corporations to bring litigation claims under RFRA.

Current Cases
The Supreme Court and United States Courts of Appeals have yet to address the merits of
whether or not for-profit corporations may claim exemptions from the Provision under Free
Exercise Clause or RFRA arguments; several Federal Districts Courts and United States Courts
of Appeals have heard cases seeking injunctions against the provision with varying results. 33
Because the cases are at the procedural stage of seeking a preliminary injunction, the holdings
are not the final rulings on the merits. In deciding whether or not to grant a preliminary
injunction, courts are generally weighing the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits
along with other factors.34 Plaintiffs are aware that litigation could continue for years, so they

32

Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
Overview. supra note 16. According to data from the National Women’s Law Center, there
have been twenty-eight cases brought by for-profit corporations challenging the Provision. Of
those, only one has reached the merits, in the government’s favor in district court, but it is
pending appeal. Six cases have resulted in a denial for any temporary relief from the Provision,
and eighteen cases have resulted in some form of temporary relief, meaning a preliminary
injunction or stay pending appeal. The United States Courts of Appeals have not reached the
merits of any of these cases, and the Supreme Court has denied a request for an emergency
injunction but has not yet reached any further analysis on the issue.
34
There is a four part test for whether a preliminary injunction should be granted which includes
33

1) whether the plaintiff will probably succeed on the merits; 2) whether
irreparable harm to the plaintiff would result if the injunction is not granted; 3) the
balance of harms between the plaintiff and defendant if the injunction is allowed;
an 4) whether the injunction will have an impact on the public interest.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow, The Motion for A Preliminary Injunction: Time for a
Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 497-98 (2003). However, some courts weigh
the factors differently or do not include all four factors in their analysis. Id. at 498; see also
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (The four factors
provide a flexible, relative test where “no single factor is determinative.”).
8

are simply seeking relief for compliance with the Provision while litigation proceeds and before
a final ruling is held. One of the most publicized of these cases is O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Services.35 This involved the Catholic owner of a mining company, O’Brien
Industrial Holdings, LLC. (OIH), bringing action for injunctive relief against the Provision.36
O’Brien claimed compliance with the provision was against his religious belief and
impermissibly violates the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.37
O’Brien argued that his religious beliefs are extended to his corporation, and that under
the holding of Citizens United, his corporation has religious liberties in the same manner as he
does in his capacity as an individual.38 In regards to O’Brien’s RFRA claim, the court did not
focus on whether or not a corporation has religious beliefs; it focused on the weight of the
burden on the exercise of religion.39 The court cited Midrash Sephardi, Inv. v. Town of Surfside,
defining a substantial burden as one that “place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious
exercise; a substantial burden is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious
adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly” on the exercise of religion.40 Using this
definition as guidance, the court did not find the provision to substantially burden OIH’s
hypothetical religious beliefs because OIH can still avoid participation in using preventative
services while subsidizing the services for other employees.41

35

O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Service, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012),
stay granted, No. 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
36
Id. at 1150.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1154; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010)
(holding that corporations are entitled to First Amendment protection in the context of political
speech).
39
O’Brien, 894 F.Supp. at 1157.
40
Id. at 1158, (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir.
2004)).
41
Id. at 1159.
9

Further, the court pointed out the incoherency of O’Brien’s RFRA claim noting that if
subsidizing other employees’ choices to purchase contraception is a substantial burden on OIH’s
religion, then the same argument could be made about paying OIH’s employees’ salaries because
those dollars could then be used to purchase contraception. 42

Emphasizing the indirect

connection in O’Brien’s argument, the court noted, “RFRA is a shield, not a sword. It protects
individuals from substantial burdens on religious exercise that occur when the government
coerces action one’s religion forbids, or forbids action one’s religion requires; it is not a means to
force one’s religious practices upon others.”43
The court also rejected O’Brien’s Free Exercise argument because it found the provision
to be facially neutral and generally applicable; thus, the appropriate standard of scrutiny is
rational basis.44 Noting the secular nature of OIH as a for-profit corporate entity, the court found
no need to analyze the facts of the supposed infringement on its religion.45 Further, the fact that
employers who hold personal, individual religious beliefs were impacted by the provision does
not mean that those employers were targeted by the provision.46 Based on these findings, the
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss O’Brien’s complaints.47 Following, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit heard O’Brien’s appeal. In a somewhat unclear,
one-sentence ruling, the Eight Circuit granted O’Brien’s stay pending appeal.48 The meaning of
the Eight Circuit ruling and what will follow continues to develop.

42

Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1159.
44
O’Brien, 894 F.Supp. at 1160.
45
Id. at 1161.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, No: 12-3357 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
43

10

The case Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius involved the Hahn family,
owners of a for-profit corporation, seeking an injunction against the provision based on Free
Exercise and RFRA claims.49 The corporation manufactures wood cabinets, and the owners are
practicing members of the Mennonite Christian religion. 50 The plaintiffs argued that their
religious beliefs extend to their corporation and cite Citizens United to support their claim that
their individual Free Exercise Rights should extend to the identity of their corporation as a
separate legal entity.51 However, the court noted that previous case law has separated “purely
personal” freedoms from those that are extended to corporations.52 Further, neither Congress nor
the Supreme Court has decided the nature of the Free Exercise Clause as it applies to
corporations; thus, the court assigned the Free Exercise Clause a “purely personal” status. 53
The court justifies its analysis of the Free Exercise Clause status for corporations by
noting that the instances where the Free Exercise Clause has been extended to entities other than
individuals have all involved religious organizations, not for-profit corporations which by their
very nature are secular.54 As a separate legal entity, the corporation does not have the same
religious rights as the individuals who own the corporation.55 The court adds that even if the
Provision infringed upon the corporation’s hypothetical religious exercise, it would find the
Provision neutral, generally applicable, and appropriately inclusive; thus, rational basis scrutiny
would apply and the provision would be upheld.56

49

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6744, 2013 WL 140110 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
11, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 12-2673(6th Cir.).
50
Id. at *3.
51
Id. at *5, citing Citizens United, 558 U.S.
52
Id. at *6.
53
Id. at *5-6.
54
Conestoga, No.12-6744, at *6.
55
Id. at *8.
56
Id. at *8-9.
11

Plaintiffs also claimed the Provision violates their rights under RFRA.57 They based this
claim on that fact that, as owners, they operate Conestoga Wood Specialties according to their
religious beliefs; therefore, the provision substantially burdens the exercise of their religious
beliefs that teach against use of contraceptives.58 The court found that it is not necessary to reach
the materiality of whether or not the provision constitutes a substantial burden on the
corporation’s religious belief because the corporation, as a separate legal entity from the owners,
cannot freely exercise its own religious beliefs. 59 In particular, the court noted that some
limitations and regulations must result when plaintiffs chose to enter into the commercial
marketplace with a for-profit corporation as opposed to choosing to make their corporation a
non-profit with a religious identity. 60 If a corporation wished to have the protections of a

57

Id. at *3.
Id. at *9.
59
Id. at *10.
60
The definition of a religious employer in regards to the Provision is still in flux. According to
the most recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the proposed qualifications for employers
eligible for accommodations is defined as one that:
58

1. opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services
required to be covered under Section 2713 of the PHS Act, on account of
religious objection; 2. Is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; 3. Holds
itself out as a religious organization; and 4. self-certifies that it meet these criteria
and specifies the contraceptive services for which it object to providing coverage.
Saying an employer qualifies for an accommodation means that the employer itself does not have
to provide coverage for contraceptives, but the employer’s employees would be provided with a
separate contraceptive coverage plan, with no cost-sharing. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).
Exemptions from the Provision are already defined in a final rule and include houses of worship
and churches. Employers that qualify for an exemption are not subject to the requirement that
employees have a separate plan for contraceptive coverage, as are the employers qualifying for
an accommodation. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventiveservices-and-religious-institutions.
12

religious entity, it could have incorporated as a non-profit with a specifically religious mission
instead of incorporating as a proprietary organization whose primary purpose is profit-seeking.61
The court continued that even if the corporation had separate religious liberties, the
plaintiffs would have to show that there is not only a burden but also pass the threshold of
showing a substantial burden on the exercise of those religious beliefs.62 The court did not find a
showing of a substantial burden and noted that the provision does not even necessarily change
whether or not employees use contraceptives stating, “it is worth emphasizing that the ultimate
and deeply private choice to use an abortifacient contraceptive rests not with the Hahns, but with
Conestoga’s employees. The fact that Conestoga’s employees are free to look outside of their
insurance coverage and pay for and use any contraception, including abortifacients, through the
salary they receive from Conestoga, amply illustrates this point.”63 Further, the burden is too
indirect to be considered substantial given the multi-step process an employee has to take in
order to obtain a contraceptive or abortifacient, including seeing a doctor for a prescription and
taking the prescription to a pharmacy, none of which involve the employers directly. 64 Because
plaintiffs did not show a likelihood for success of their Free Exercise, RFRA, and other claims,
their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.65
Following the District Court’s ruling, Conestoga sought a stay pending appeal in the
Third Circuit.66 Noting the request for a stay pending appeal as an extreme remedy, the Third

61

Women’s Preventive Services. supra note 15 (noting the emphasis on a corporation’s status as
non-profit in order to qualify for an accommodation).
62
Id. at *12-13.
63
Id. at *13.
64
Id. at *14.
65
Id. at *18.
66
Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, No.
13-1144, 2013 WL 1277419 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013).
13

Circuit denied the motion.67 The Third Circuit followed the same analysis as the District Court
and found the reasoning to be sound stating “because Plaintiffs failed to prove their likelihood of
success on the merits, we DENY their request for extraordinary relief.”68
The Western District of Oklahoma made similar findings in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v.
Sebelius. Hobby Lobby is owned by the Green family who are practicing Christians, and they
sought an injunction against the Provision claiming violations of religious liberty under the Free
Exercise Clause, RFRA, and other law.69 In regards to the plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim, the
court, in a similar analysis as Conestoga, found that secular, for-profit corporations do not enjoy
the entirety of individual First Amendment rights and are excluded from those rights that are
considered “purely personal.”70 The Greens may have had a stronger Free Exercise argument if
Hobby Lobby Stores was a religious organization because Free Exercise rights are extended to
religious organizations, but Hobby Lobby is a secular, for-profit corporation and not a religious
organization.71 Because the court found that Free Exercise rights are not extended to Hobby
Lobby, it did not go through the merits of the claim of a Free Exercise infringement and found
this claim will likely fail.72
The plaintiffs also claimed the Provision violated the corporation’s religious liberty based
on the ability for the corporation to have a separate exercise of religion from the owners. 73
However, the court found that Hobby Lobby, as a separate legal entity from its owners, does not

67

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
69
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012).
70
Id. at 1287-88.
71
Id. at 1288.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1291.
68

14

exercise religion.74 In support of this finding, the court provided, “They [corporations] do not
pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivates actions separate and apart
from the intention and direction of their individuals actors.” 75 It followed that the plaintiff’s
motion for an injunction was denied.76 Agreeing with the District Court’s findings, the Tenth
Circuit denied the plaintiff’s motion for injunction, and Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor
also denied plaintiff’s application for injunction, noting that the success of Hobby Lobby’s
claims was not clear.77
Because the United States Courts of Appeals have not yet reached the merits of any of the
challenges against the Provision, district courts are facing complex decisions about what to
follow as precedent and are reaching different conclusions. For example, the outcome American
Pulverizer case was and continues to be influenced by the O’Brien case.78 The Western District
of Missouri reached a different outcome than the district courts in the above cases, in part
because of the influence of the Eight Circuit in granting a stay pending appeal to O’Brien. 79 The
plaintiffs in American Pulverizer identify as Evangelical Christians and challenged the Provision
as being inconsistent with their religious beliefs and claimed compliance with the Provision
would violate RFRA.80
Noting the facts as similar to O’Brien, the court found plaintiffs would incur an injury
without an injunction, the injury to plaintiffs would outweigh the injury to the public interest
74

Id. at 1291.
Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d, at 1291.
76
Id. at 1297.
77
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012).
78
Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012
WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012).
79
Id. at *1 (After a phone conference with the Eight Circuit, the District Court found “ the Court
construes the Eight Circuit’s November 28, 2012 opinion … has established precedent that on
facts similar to those presented in O’Brien, Plaintiffs are like to succeed on the merits.”).
80
Id. at *2.
75

15

resulting in the denial of an injunction, and that Plaintiff’s RFRA claims require a deliberate
investigation.81 Because of these factors, combined with influence of the O’Brien stay, the court
found “ that the balance of equities top strongly in favor of injunctive relief in this case and that
Plaintiffs have raised questions concerning their likelihood of success on the merits that are so
serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation.” 82 This demonstrates how,
because of difference in analysis or review, district courts are reaching different conclusions for
very similar challenges. This paper find the courts denying preliminary injunctions to be correct
because of their analysis on Free Exercise and RFRA claims.

Analysis
As the cases above illustrate, much of the debate about whether or not for-profit
corporations should be able to succeed on Free Exercise and First Amendment claims depends
on whether or not a corporation has the ability to exercise religion. Employers in the above cases
cited Citizens United as a reason to assert the validity of their corporation’s religious liberty, but
does Citizens United really mean that individuals can extend religious views to their corporation?
It is true that some First Amendment protections apply to private corporations, but as described
by the above case law, corporations do not enjoy all First Amendment protections, and the
difference comes to down to whether or not the protection is considered purely personal or not.83
Additionally, it is important to analyze how a corporation gains a religious identity and
whether or not it automatically reflects its owners’ respective religious beliefs. Perhaps the
81

Id. at *4 (The court did not find that Plaintiffs were necessarily likely to succeed on the merits
of their RFRA claim, only that the question of those merits was so serious and difficult that it
weighed heavily in favor of granting a preliminary injunction.).
82
Id. at *5; see also Overview, supra note 16 (According to the National Women’s Law Center,
further review of this decision will depend on the outcome of the O’Brien case.).
83
Conestoga, No.12-6744, at *5-6.
16

corporation’s mission statement should be taken into account or whether or not the corporation
participates in any kind of religiously-based charity work or establishes a religiously-based
foundation. The requirements for how a for-profit corporation adopts religious beliefs remain
unclear. In contrast, there are clearer processes for non-profits wishing to claim a religious
identity for special treatment or certain exemptions from federal and state law. For example, a
church is granted a federal tax exemption if it qualifies under IRC 501(c)(3) as being “organized
and operated exclusively for religious … purposes …no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual …” and does not participate in certain
political activity. 84 When considering the tax-exempt status of an entity incorporating as a
religious organization, including religiously-affiliated non-profits, the IRS examines factors such
as contribution to private interest and individuals.85
The current healthcare system already gives employers, as an aggregate, a powerful
position in the marketplace which greatly impacts people who obtain health insurance through
their employer.86 Employers act as an agent of healthcare provider for their employees, meaning
employers take the role of choosing and purchasing the insurance plans on behalf of their
employees, who are in the role of principle. 87 This agency relationship has some cost and
bargaining benefits and in theory means the employer is acting in the best interest of the
employee as its agent. 88 However, it also means that much of the decision-making in the
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healthcare coverage process comes not from the employees themselves but from the employer.89
Discussing the possibility of giving employers more power to shape the healthcare choices of
their employees must necessarily be in the context of the amount of control employers already
maintain because of their agency relationship with their employees.
Interpreting law as giving corporations the ability to express religious belief and practice
could open the door to employers gaining even more control over the lives of their employees
than they already have. For-profit corporations, in their aggregate, have a powerful position in
the marketplace and can use that position to decide how to treat their employees. For one, if forprofit employers gained the ability to claim an exemption from the provision, it would,
“substantially undermine the government’s compelling goals due to the very large numbers of
employees who would be denied contraception coverage by such an exemption.”90
Additionally, there are valid concerns about giving corporations the power to
discriminate based on religion if those corporations are in the position to enforce certain religious
beliefs over others. The American Constitution Society, a legal organization that promotes
constitutional values, provides; “Federal laws prohibiting religious discrimination in employment
incorporate national values that condemn an employers use of the economic leverage of current
or prospective employment to penalize employers for their religious practices or to compel them
involuntarily to conform to the religious practice of other.”91 When employers attempt to control
the healthcare choices their employees can and cannot make based on religious beliefs, it appears
identical to imposing their religious practices on their employees.
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Restricting healthcare choices in regards to access to preventative services in this manner,
especially given the large economic impact of for-profit corporations, is a form a social control,
and it impacts women in a much more direct way than men.92 Further, it inherently places more
value on certain religious beliefs than others. As noted by the ACLU, showing preference for
one religious belief over another is contrary to our country’s values; “Religious freedom means
everyone is entitled to their religious beliefs. We neither rank the legitimacy of those beliefs, nor
allow them to be used a license to discriminate or harm others. Dismantling the contraception
rule would violate these principles.”93 By choosing to value certain religious beliefs over others
in the context of employment, the government would be communicating the message not only
that religious beliefs have inherently different value, but that it is also permissible for employers
to control which religious beliefs carry more weight than others.
Instead, the government should promote the principle of religious equality by disallowing
for-profit corporations from claiming a religious exemption from the Provision. 94 First, the
Constitution already contains robust religious protections including the protection of prayer and
preaching under the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
These protections are reflected in the exemptions and options for religious institutions that are
already available such as the grandfathered plan provision, the options of a third-party insurer,
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and the option to terminate coverage altogether.95 Additionally, when discussing the equality
concerns that are incident to Free Exercise analysis, William Marshall, professor of law at the
University of North Carolina School of Law, stated, “ a constitutional preference for religious
belief cuts at the heart of the central principle of the Free Speech Clause-that every idea is of
equal dignity and status in the marketplace.”

96

Not only would belief preference

disproportionately favor majority religious beliefs and religious beliefs in general over other
belief structures, it would create an alarming slippery slope of exemptions.97 Considering the
United States is a nation of vastly different, diverse religious traditions and belief systems, it
would be virtually impossible to accommodate everyone and would necessarily involve valuing
certain beliefs over others.98
If employers are allowed the ability to choose which religious beliefs should be valued
above others, it will put them in the position to be able influence their employees’ choices and
favor certain employees over others. Employers’ influence could be used to select employee or
even coerce employees into values and beliefs that reflect their employer’s values and beliefs.
By entering into the marketplace as a secular, for-profit corporation, these employers have
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subjected themselves to certain constraints including employment discrimination laws. 99 It
follows that exempting for-profit corporations from the provision, “would enable the use of
employment to encourage and even to compel involuntary employee conformance with the
employer’s religious practices,” and, “would fundamentally distort employment markets in favor
of religious employers.” 100 This economic effect would parallel and exacerbate the existing
impact of employees seeking out certain jobs solely for access to health insurance in general. 101
Thus, exempting for-profits from the provision requirements would, in effect, go against
employment discrimination laws while having a great impact on the large economic pull forprofit corporations have in the marketplace.
Giving the power to employers to enforce values of ranking religious belief also has
negative implications for the government and superseding the role of the government. Some socalled narrower solutions that have been proposed as an alternative to the provision include
requiring the government to pay for services to which employers have religious objections, such
as certain contraceptives.102 Further, as noted by the American Constitution Society, “a religious
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person’s right to an exemption does not include the right to demand that the government for the
exemption.”103
Even if employers could establish that their corporations had the ability to exercise
religion, they would also have to overcome the compelling government interest in women’s
healthcare as required by both the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA 104. As described above,
RFRA was enacted partially because interest groups felt it had become too easy for the
government to override religious liberties by declaring advancement of a government interest.105
However, the government has a very strong argument in regards to its interests in expanding
access to women’s preventative healthcare because the Provision aims to promote equality.106
One of the strongest arguments for the government is the fact that the vast majority of women
will use contraception at some point during their lives.107 Since women make up over half the
population in the United States, it follows that contraception access impacts a large proportion of
the over 315 million people in the country.108
In addition to looking at the numbers of contraceptive users in the United States, it is
important to consider how preventative healthcare access affects different segments of the
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population, especially when it comes to disproportionately negative impacts. One of the goals of
the ACA is to alleviate healthcare disparities, and the Provision plays a large role in this effort.109
First, access to preventative healthcare impacts people differently based on their gender. This is
partially because economic disparities associated with spending on reproductive health; when
looking at similar insurance policies for people who are the same age, women are likely to spend
significantly more in out-of-pocket costs than men as a result of paying for preventative
healthcare.110 Consequently, insurance companies are also charging women more than men for
coverage because of their different preventative healthcare needs.111
Women are also economically impacted because of the implications reproductive health
access has on their ability to earn wages and succeed in careers, factors having a large impact on
women’s ability to achieve equality. Research indicates that access to family planning greatly
influences women’s choices when it comes to careers and advanced education resulting in
greater access correlating with higher wages for women.112 Quoting one of the most important
Supreme Court decisions on reproductive health, the ACLU notes; “The ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”113 Giving more women the opportunity to choose
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their economic path promotes the government’s goal of working for gender equality.114
Additionally, the Provision will help alleviate health disparities between men and
women. Increased access to preventative health helps reduce the rates of unintended pregnancy;
unintended pregnancies have long-term health effects for women and their unborn children.115 In
his comment in the University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class,
Chad Brooker states “women with unintended pregnancies are more likely than those with
intended pregnancies to receive later or not prenatal care, to smoke and consume alcohol during
pregnancy, and to experience domestic violence during pregnancy.” 116 While conservative
lawmakers and policymakers may attribute these disparities to lifestyle choices, research
supports the finding that disparities are largely a result of unequal access to preventative health
services and that women who cannot access preventative health services may not immediately
realize they are pregnant, resulting in higher rates of risky behavior. 117 The realities of the
negative consequences for women resulting from health access barriers emphasize the need for
the Provision because it seeks to expand access to preventative health services.
114
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In addition to general gender disparities, there are also measureable disparities amongst
women based on ethnicity, race, and socioeconomic income level. 118

While unintended

pregnancies generally decreased between 2001-2006, the decrease occurred largely within
groups of high-income women as opposed to low-income women and women of color who saw
an increase in the rate of unintended pregnancy.119 Because low-income women and women of
color are often marginalized in other ways and may be less able to access other necessary health
resources, it follows that the government has an interest in increasing access to preventative
health services for these groups. The Provision aims to alleviate race, gender, and class
disparities; The Department of Health and Human Services noted the government interests
asserted in the Provision, “including better treatment of conditions unrelated to pregnancy for
which contraceptives are often prescribed, improvement of the health of pregnant women and
newborn children, reduction in the cost of employer-sponsored health care plans, reduction in
workplace inequalities between men and women, and reduction in the disparate health care costs
borne by men and women.”120
In the context of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA, the compelling government interest
plays an important role, but it is not absolutely controlling.

As discussed previously, a

corporation’s ability to practice religious exercise is not clearly established, but if,
hypothetically, a corporation could exercise the same religion as its onwers, further analysis of
the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA also supports the finding that for-profit corporations should
be compelled to comply with the provision. First, it is helpful to examine the neutrality and
118
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general applicability of the Provision. In the cases cited, the employers generally claim the
provision infringes upon the corporation’s religious liberty because the owners cannot comply
with the Provision without violating their religious beliefs. While validity of the owners’
religious beliefs is not questioned, the American Constitution Society notes, “Free Exercise
doctrine condemns only intentional religious discrimination, not religious burdens occurring as
the incidental effect of a neutral and general law.”121
Finding the general neutrality of a law is key in Free Exercise analysis.122 Looking strictly at
the language of the Provision and the exemptions, it clearly applies to all for-profit employers
equally; it does not specifically target any type of employer or target any particular religious
belief. 123 The current legal interpretation of this part of the application of the Free Exercise
Clause is derived from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith, where Scalia emphasized the difference
between a law intentionally infringing on one’s religious beliefs and a law incidentally having a
disproportionate impact on one’s religious beliefs; incidental disproportionate impact means that
a law is only subject to the low standard of rational basis scrutiny. 124 Richard F. Duncan,
professor of law at University of Nebraska College of Law adds; “Under Smith and Lukumi, the
majority may rule without any fear of religious anarchy, so long as the burdens it creates are not
imposed selectively.”125
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It is important to note why women’s preventative health is even being scrutinized, especially
when compared to the history of regulating men’s reproductive health choices. Women’s health
has a history of being used as a wedge issue, a tool for leverage that is continuously surrendered
as unimportant in legislative and policy disputes.126 Indeed, the issues of contraception coverage
in the Provision have received the most attention of any issue in the ACA, and abortion coverage
was off the table from almost the very beginning of the discussion.127 Groups of Catholic clergy
members have been some of the most outspoken opponents of the Provision and have proven
influential in the accommodation discussions.128
The strong influence of religious clergy not only harms women’s health, it contributes to the
perpetuation of religious belief taking precedence over strong scientific evidence. 129 Religious
belief overcoming scientific evidence is particularly relevant in the context of emergency
contraception, which has been described as an abortifacient despite strong scientific evidence
that emergency contraception only prevents pregnancy and does not cause a termination of an
existing pregnancy.130
To compare why this is notable, it is helpful to imagine this kind of treatment being given to
another subject. For example, similar to employees choosing how to use their health insurance
coverage, employees also have control over how to spend their salaries in regards to their
housing arrangements. The ACLU notes, “ it would be hard to argue that there is a great burden
on an employer’s religion if an employee uses her salary to pay for an apartment where she
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cohabitates unmarried with her boyfriend, contrary to her employer’s religious beliefs.” 131 Yet,
aspects other than reproductive health choices of employees’ personal lives are not given the
same kind of attention and scrutiny.
Women’s contraceptives were not always considered a basic part of health insurance
coverage. However, this began to change during the women’s reproductive health movement,
which has its origins questioning the physician-patient relationship and advocating for more
autonomy for women making choices about their healthcare decisions. 132

Demands for

insurance coverage increased in response to Viagra becoming a covered prescription, shortly
after its development.133 Prior to the enactment of the ACA, twenty-six states already mandated
that for-profit employers include contraceptive coverage in their group health insurance plans.134
Notable cases in California and New York illustrate how courts approached claims of religious
liberty violation from mandated contraceptive coverage.135
Recommendations
This paper advocates against for-profit corporations being able to claim an exemption to
the Provision based on Free Exercise, RFRA, or any other claims. The district courts denying
preliminary injunctions, in their initial analysis of the merits, have the correct interpretation.
131
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When courts reach the merits of these cases, they should deny plaintiff’s relief from the
compliance with the Provision. This paper would advocate for the elimination of all exemptions
and accommodations to the Provision, but if any exemptions and accommodations are going to
be finalized, they should not include for-profit corporations.
The flood of litigation stemming from the Provision reflects problems with attitudes about
women’s healthcare. Women’s preventative healthcare, especially when it involves reproductive
choices, is a constant source of controversy even decades after birth control and abortion were
widely legalized. Several reasons may exist as to why women’s reproductive health is always
being debated. Even as other social issues progress and society continues to accept changes,
contraception and abortion are under continuous attack by legislators and conservative
lobbyists.136 Consequently, one solution would be to address the philosophical and ideological
origins of the views that advocate for restrictions on women’s preventative health, and to try to
unravel the systemic sexism that exists in regards women’s health status.
Women’s health is too valuable to continue to be used as a political tool. Authors Nancy
Levit, professor of Law at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, and Robert
R.M. Verchick, professor of law at Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, address the
value of women’s reproductive health in their book Feminist Legal Theory.137 Discussing the
impact of reproductive health, the authors stated “Yet women’s ability to control their
reproductive lives is about much more than whether they choose to have children. Reproductive
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liberty is connected to all other aspects of women’s equality—the ability to hold a job, obtain an
education, participate in sports, or escape gender-based violence from spouses …”138
Women’s health should not be subject to scrutiny based on the religious beliefs of others.
The government should make a point that women’s health, in the context of federal law, must
take precedence over religious belief. By valuing health for all people, the government acts in
the best interest of all citizens no matter their religious beliefs and preserves the right for private
citizens to practice their own religious beliefs in their private lives without imposing those
beliefs on others who may or may not share them. By no means does this position advocate in
any way for the control of religious beliefs in one’s private capacity, it is simply advocating for
those religious beliefs to not trump women’s health in government. It is vitally important to
separate the role of religion in one’s private life from the role of religion in government.
Another solution would be to reexamine the way healthcare is provided in the United States.
While it is true that the ACA provides significant progress in that it will cover millions of the
previously uninsured population, it still is based off a mostly competitive, private market for
health insurance, funneled through employers. This means that healthcare is still largely
dependent on the agency relationship between employee and employer.

In this dependent

relationship, it becomes possible for employers to control the healthcare choices and healthcare
access of their employees. In the long-term, it would be helpful to solve these seemingly endless
disputes about the kinds of healthcare women deserve by transition to a single, universal payer
for healthcare or at least a more centralized source that could not restrict a woman’s healthcare
choices based on religious beliefs or disagreements with so-called “lifestyle choices.”
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Conclusion
The enactment of the ACA represents a huge step forward for expanding access to the
health coverage in the United States. It was a victory for the public as a whole and for women’s
rights when the Provision was added to the ACA. Expanding contraception access and breaking
down barriers of cost will have positive, life-changing effects for women and their families.
While the United States has a valuable cultural and legal tradition of protecting religious
freedoms, that tradition cannot continue by imposing religious beliefs on others. The Provision
does not threaten one’s ability to exercise religion under the Free Exercise Claus or RFRA.
Further, exercise of religion is not automatically extended from an individual to that
individual’s for-profit corporation. Even if courts could somehow find a burden on religion
caused by the generally applicable Provision, that burden must be outweighed by the
government’s interest in women’s health. It would set an extremely dangerous precedent for
women and other marginalized groups if courts turned their backs on women’s health and held in
favor of for-profit corporations challenging the Provision. For-profit corporations must comply
with the Provision and should not be granted an exemption.
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